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source: vbox/trunk/src/libs/openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c@ 84207

最後變更 在這個檔案從84207是 83916,由 vboxsync 提交於 5 年 前

openssl-1.1.1g: Applied and adjusted our OpenSSL changes to 1.1.1g. bugref:9719
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1/*
2 * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11#include "../ssl_local.h"
12#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13#include "statem_local.h"
14
15EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
17 size_t chainidx)
18{
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
20 if (!s->renegotiate)
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
22
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
31 }
32
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
34}
35
36EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
38 size_t chainidx)
39{
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 }
58
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60}
61
62/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 size_t chainidx)
66{
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
69
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
71 /*-
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
74 */
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
83 }
84
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
86}
87
88#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
91{
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
95
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
109 }
110
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
112}
113#endif
114
115#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
117{
118 int i, end, ret = 0;
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
121
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
124 return 0;
125
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
130
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
136 ret = 1;
137 break;
138 }
139 }
140
141 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
142 return ret;
143}
144
145EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
146 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
147 size_t chainidx)
148{
149 const unsigned char *pformats;
150 size_t num_formats;
151
152 if (!use_ecc(s))
153 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
154
155 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
156 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
157
158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
159 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
160 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
161 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
164 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
166 }
167
168 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
169}
170
171EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
172 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
173 size_t chainidx)
174{
175 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
176 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
177
178 if (!use_ecc(s))
179 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
180
181 /*
182 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
183 */
184 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
185 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
186
187 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
188 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
189 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
190 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
192 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
194 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
195 }
196 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
197 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
198 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
199
200 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
201 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
203 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
205 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
206 }
207 }
208 }
209 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
211 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
214 }
215
216 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
217}
218#endif
219
220EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
221 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
222 size_t chainidx)
223{
224 size_t ticklen;
225
226 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
227 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
228
229 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
230 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
231 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
232 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
233 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
234 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
235 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
236 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
237 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
239 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
242 }
243 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
244 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
245 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
246 } else {
247 ticklen = 0;
248 }
249
250 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
251 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
252 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
253
254 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
255 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
257 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
259 }
260
261 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
262}
263
264EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
265 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
266 size_t chainidx)
267{
268 size_t salglen;
269 const uint16_t *salg;
270
271 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
272 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
273
274 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
276 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
277 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
278 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
279 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
280 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
281 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
282 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
286 }
287
288 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
289}
290
291#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
292EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
293 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
294 size_t chainidx)
295{
296 int i;
297
298 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
299 if (x != NULL)
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
301
302 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
303 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
304
305 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
306 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
308 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
309 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
312 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
313 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
314 }
315 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
316 unsigned char *idbytes;
317 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
318 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
319
320 if (idlen <= 0
321 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
322 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
323 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
325 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
328 }
329 }
330 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
331 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
333 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
334 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
335 }
336 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
337 unsigned char *extbytes;
338 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
339
340 if (extlen < 0) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
345 }
346 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
347 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
348 != extlen) {
349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
350 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
352 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
353 }
354 }
355 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
357 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
358 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
359 }
360
361 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
362}
363#endif
364
365#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
366EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
367 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
368{
369 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
370 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
371
372 /*
373 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
374 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
375 */
376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
377 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
380 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
381 }
382
383 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
384}
385#endif
386
387EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
388 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
389{
390 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
391
392 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
393 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
394
395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
396 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
397 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
398 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
399 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
400 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
403 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
404 }
405 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
406
407 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
408}
409
410
411#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
412EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
413 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
414 size_t chainidx)
415{
416 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
417 int i, end;
418
419 if (clnt == NULL)
420 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
421
422 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
423 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
424 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
425 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
426 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
430 }
431
432 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
433 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
434 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
435 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
436
437 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
439 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
440 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
441 }
442 }
443 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
444 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
445 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
446 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
448 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
450 }
451
452 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
453}
454#endif
455
456EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
457 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
458{
459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
460 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
461
462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
463 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
467 }
468
469 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
470}
471
472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
473EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
474 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
475{
476 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
477 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
478
479 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
480 if (x != NULL)
481 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
482
483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
487 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
488 }
489
490 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
491}
492#endif
493
494EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
495 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
496{
497 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
498 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
501 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
502 }
503
504 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
505}
506
507EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
508 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
509 size_t chainidx)
510{
511 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
512
513 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
514 if (reason != 0) {
515 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
516 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
517 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
518 }
519
520 /*
521 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
522 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
523 */
524 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
525 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
526
527 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
528 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
529 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
531 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
533 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
534 }
535
536 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
537 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
539 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
541 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
542 }
543 }
544 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
548 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
549 }
550
551 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
552}
553
554/*
555 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
556 */
557EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
558 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
559 size_t chainidx)
560{
561#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
562 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
563
564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
566 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
567 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
568 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
570 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
572 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
574 }
575
576 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
577 if (nodhe)
578 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
579#endif
580
581 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
582}
583
584#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
585static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
586{
587 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
588 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
589 size_t encodedlen;
590
591 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
592 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
595 return 0;
596 }
597 /*
598 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
599 */
600 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
601 } else {
602 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
603 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
604 /* SSLfatal() already called */
605 return 0;
606 }
607 }
608
609 /* Encode the public key. */
610 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
611 &encoded_point);
612 if (encodedlen == 0) {
613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
614 goto err;
615 }
616
617 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
618 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
619 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
622 goto err;
623 }
624
625 /*
626 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
627 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
628 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
629 */
630 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
631 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
632 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
633
634 return 1;
635 err:
636 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
637 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
638 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
639 return 0;
640}
641#endif
642
643EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
644 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
645 size_t chainidx)
646{
647#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
648 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
649 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
650 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
651
652 /* key_share extension */
653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
654 /* Extension data sub-packet */
655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
656 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
659 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
660 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
661 }
662
663 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
664
665 /*
666 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
667 * now, just send one
668 */
669 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
670 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
671 } else {
672 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
673
674 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
675 continue;
676
677 curve_id = pgroups[i];
678 break;
679 }
680 }
681
682 if (curve_id == 0) {
683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
684 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
685 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
686 }
687
688 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
691 }
692
693 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
695 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
696 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
697 }
698 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
699#else
700 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
701#endif
702}
703
704EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
705 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
706{
707 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
708
709 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
710 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
711 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
712
713 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
714 /* Extension data sub-packet */
715 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
716 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
717 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
718 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 goto end;
722 }
723
724 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
725 end:
726 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
727 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
728 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
729
730 return ret;
731}
732
733EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
734 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
735 size_t chainidx)
736{
737#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
738 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
739#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
740 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
741 size_t idlen = 0;
742 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
743 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
744 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
745
746 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
747 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
748
749 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
750 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
751 || (psksess != NULL
752 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
753 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
755 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
756 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
757 }
758
759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
760 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
761 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
762 size_t psklen = 0;
763
764 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
765 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
766 psk, sizeof(psk));
767
768 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
770 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
772 } else if (psklen > 0) {
773 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
774 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
775
776 idlen = strlen(identity);
777 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
779 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
781 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
782 }
783 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
784
785 /*
786 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
787 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
788 */
789 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
790 if (cipher == NULL) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
795 }
796
797 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
798 if (psksess == NULL
799 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
800 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
801 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
803 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
805 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
806 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
807 }
808 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
809 }
810 }
811#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
812
813 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
814 s->psksession = psksess;
815 if (psksess != NULL) {
816 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
817 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
818 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
820 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
821 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
822 }
823 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
824 }
825
826 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
827 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
828 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
829 s->max_early_data = 0;
830 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
831 }
832 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
833 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
834
835 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
836 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
837 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
838 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
840 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
841 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
842 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
843 }
844 }
845
846 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
848 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
849 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
850 }
851
852 /*
853 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
854 * data.
855 */
856 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
857 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
858 int found = 0;
859
860 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
862 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
863 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
864 }
865 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
866 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
867 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
868 found = 1;
869 break;
870 }
871 }
872 if (!found) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
874 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
875 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
876 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
877 }
878 }
879
880 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
881 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
882 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
885 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
886 }
887
888 /*
889 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
890 * extension, we set it to accepted.
891 */
892 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
893 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
894
895 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
896}
897
898#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
899#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
900
901/*
902 * PSK pre binder overhead =
903 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
904 * 2 bytes for extension length
905 * 2 bytes for identities list length
906 * 2 bytes for identity length
907 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
908 * 2 bytes for binder list length
909 * 1 byte for binder length
910 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
911 * subsequent binder bytes
912 */
913#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
914
915EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
916 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
917 size_t chainidx)
918{
919 unsigned char *padbytes;
920 size_t hlen;
921
922 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
923 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
924
925 /*
926 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
927 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
928 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
929 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
930 */
931 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
934 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
935 }
936
937 /*
938 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
939 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
940 */
941 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
942 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
943 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
944 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
945
946 if (md != NULL) {
947 /*
948 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
949 * length.
950 */
951 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
952 + EVP_MD_size(md);
953 }
954 }
955
956 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
957 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
958 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
959
960 /*
961 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
962 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
963 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
964 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
965 */
966 if (hlen > 4)
967 hlen -= 4;
968 else
969 hlen = 1;
970
971 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
972 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
975 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
976 }
977 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
978 }
979
980 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
981}
982
983/*
984 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
985 */
986EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
987 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
988{
989#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
990 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
991 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
992 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
993 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
994 int dores = 0;
995
996 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
997
998 /*
999 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1000 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1001 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1002 */
1003
1004 /*
1005 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1006 * so don't add this extension.
1007 */
1008 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1009 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1010 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1011
1012 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1013 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1014
1015 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1016 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1017 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1020 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1021 }
1022 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1023 if (mdres == NULL) {
1024 /*
1025 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1026 * Ignore it
1027 */
1028 goto dopsksess;
1029 }
1030
1031 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1032 /*
1033 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1034 * so we can't use it.
1035 */
1036 goto dopsksess;
1037 }
1038
1039 /*
1040 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1041 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1042 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1043 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1044 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1045 * issue.
1046 */
1047 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1048 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1049 /*
1050 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1051 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1052 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1053 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1054 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1055 * happen.
1056 */
1057 if (agesec > 0)
1058 agesec--;
1059
1060 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1061 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1062 goto dopsksess;
1063 }
1064
1065 /*
1066 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1067 * good enough.
1068 */
1069 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1070
1071 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1072 /*
1073 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1074 * If so we just ignore it.
1075 */
1076 goto dopsksess;
1077 }
1078
1079 /*
1080 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1081 * to be mod 2^32.
1082 */
1083 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1084
1085 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1086 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1087 dores = 1;
1088 }
1089
1090 dopsksess:
1091 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1092 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1093
1094 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1095 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1096 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1097 /*
1098 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1099 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1100 */
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1102 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1103 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1104 }
1105
1106 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1107 /*
1108 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1109 * session. This is an application bug.
1110 */
1111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1112 SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1113 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1114 }
1115
1116 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1117 }
1118
1119 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1120 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1126 }
1127
1128 if (dores) {
1129 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1130 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1131 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1135 }
1136 }
1137
1138 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1139 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1140 s->psksession_id_len)
1141 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1144 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1145 }
1146 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1147 }
1148
1149 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1151 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1152 || (dores
1153 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1154 || (s->psksession != NULL
1155 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1156 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1157 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1158 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1159 /*
1160 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1161 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1162 */
1163 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1167 }
1168
1169 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1170
1171 if (dores
1172 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1173 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1174 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1175 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1176 }
1177
1178 if (s->psksession != NULL
1179 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1180 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1182 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1183 }
1184
1185 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1186#else
1187 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1188#endif
1189}
1190
1191EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1192 unsigned int context,
1193 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1194{
1195#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1196 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1197 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1198
1199 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1200 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1202 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1204 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1207 }
1208
1209 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1210
1211 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1212#else
1213 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1214#endif
1215}
1216
1217
1218/*
1219 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1220 */
1221int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1222 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1223{
1224 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1225 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1226 size_t ilen;
1227 const unsigned char *data;
1228
1229 /* Check for logic errors */
1230 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1231 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1232 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1233 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 return 0;
1237 }
1238
1239 /* Parse the length byte */
1240 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1242 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1243 return 0;
1244 }
1245
1246 /* Consistency check */
1247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1249 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1250 return 0;
1251 }
1252
1253 /* Check that the extension matches */
1254 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1256 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1261 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1262 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1264 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1265 return 0;
1266 }
1267
1268 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1269 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1270 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1272 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1273 return 0;
1274 }
1275 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1276
1277 return 1;
1278}
1279
1280/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1281int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1282 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1283{
1284 unsigned int value;
1285
1286 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1288 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1289 return 0;
1290 }
1291
1292 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1293 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1295 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1296 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1297 return 0;
1298 }
1299
1300 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1301 /*-
1302 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1303 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1304 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1305 */
1306 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1308 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1309 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1310 return 0;
1311 }
1312
1313 /*
1314 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1315 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1316 */
1317 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1318
1319 return 1;
1320}
1321
1322int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1323 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1324{
1325 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 return 0;
1329 }
1330
1331 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1333 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1334 return 0;
1335 }
1336
1337 if (!s->hit) {
1338 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1341 return 0;
1342 }
1343 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1344 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 return 0;
1348 }
1349 }
1350
1351 return 1;
1352}
1353
1354#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1355int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1356 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1357{
1358 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1359 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1360
1361 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1363 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1364 return 0;
1365 }
1366 if (!s->hit) {
1367 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1368 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1370 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1371 return 0;
1372 }
1373
1374 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1375 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1376 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1377 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1379 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1380 return 0;
1381 }
1382
1383 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1384
1385 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1386 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
1387 ecpointformats_len)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 return 0;
1391 }
1392 }
1393
1394 return 1;
1395}
1396#endif
1397
1398int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1399 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1400{
1401 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1402 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1403 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1404 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1406 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1407 return 0;
1408 }
1409
1410 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1412 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1413 return 0;
1414 }
1415 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1417 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420
1421 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1422
1423 return 1;
1424}
1425
1426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1427int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1428 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1429{
1430 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1431 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1432 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1433 return 1;
1434 }
1435
1436 /*
1437 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1438 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1439 */
1440 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1441 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1442 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1443 return 0;
1444 }
1445 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1447 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1448 return 0;
1449 }
1450
1451 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1452 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1453 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1454 */
1455 if (chainidx != 0)
1456 return 1;
1457
1458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1459 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1460 }
1461
1462 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1463 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1464
1465 return 1;
1466}
1467#endif
1468
1469
1470#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1471int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1472 size_t chainidx)
1473{
1474 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1475 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1476 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1477 return 1;
1478 }
1479
1480 /*
1481 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1482 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1483 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1484 */
1485 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1486 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1487
1488 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1489 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1490 s->ext.scts = NULL;
1491
1492 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1493 if (size > 0) {
1494 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1495 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1496 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 return 0;
1500 }
1501 }
1502 } else {
1503 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1504 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1505
1506 /*
1507 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1508 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1509 */
1510 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1511 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1512 NULL) == NULL) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1514 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1515 return 0;
1516 }
1517
1518 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1519 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1520 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1521 x, chainidx)) {
1522 /* SSLfatal already called */
1523 return 0;
1524 }
1525 }
1526
1527 return 1;
1528}
1529#endif
1530
1531
1532#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1533/*
1534 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1535 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1536 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1537 */
1538static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1539{
1540 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1541
1542 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1543 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1544 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1546 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1547 return 0;
1548 }
1549 }
1550
1551 return 1;
1552}
1553
1554int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1555 size_t chainidx)
1556{
1557 unsigned char *selected;
1558 unsigned char selected_len;
1559 PACKET tmppkt;
1560
1561 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1562 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1563 return 1;
1564
1565 /* We must have requested it. */
1566 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1568 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1569 return 0;
1570 }
1571
1572 /* The data must be valid */
1573 tmppkt = *pkt;
1574 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1575 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1576 return 0;
1577 }
1578 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1579 PACKET_data(pkt),
1580 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1581 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1582 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1584 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1585 return 0;
1586 }
1587
1588 /*
1589 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1590 * a single Serverhello
1591 */
1592 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1593 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1594 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1596 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 return 0;
1598 }
1599
1600 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1601 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1602 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1603
1604 return 1;
1605}
1606#endif
1607
1608int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1609 size_t chainidx)
1610{
1611 size_t len;
1612
1613 /* We must have requested it. */
1614 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1616 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1617 return 0;
1618 }
1619 /*-
1620 * The extension data consists of:
1621 * uint16 list_length
1622 * uint8 proto_length;
1623 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1624 */
1625 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1626 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1627 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1629 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1630 return 0;
1631 }
1632 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1633 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1634 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1636 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1637 return 0;
1638 }
1639 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1641 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1642 return 0;
1643 }
1644 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1645
1646 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1647 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1648 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1649 != 0) {
1650 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1651 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1652 }
1653 if (!s->hit) {
1654 /*
1655 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1656 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1657 */
1658 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1660 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1661 return 0;
1662 }
1663 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1664 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1665 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1667 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1668 return 0;
1669 }
1670 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1671 }
1672
1673 return 1;
1674}
1675
1676#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1677int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1678 size_t chainidx)
1679{
1680 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1681 int i;
1682 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1683 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1684
1685 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1686 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1687 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1688 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1690 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1691 return 0;
1692 }
1693
1694 if (mki != 0) {
1695 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1697 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1698 return 0;
1699 }
1700
1701 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1702 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1703 if (clnt == NULL) {
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1705 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1706 return 0;
1707 }
1708
1709 /*
1710 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1711 * presumably offered)
1712 */
1713 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1714 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1715
1716 if (prof->id == id) {
1717 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1718 return 1;
1719 }
1720 }
1721
1722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1723 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1724 return 0;
1725}
1726#endif
1727
1728int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1729 size_t chainidx)
1730{
1731 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1732 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1733 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1734 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1735 s->ext.use_etm = 1;
1736
1737 return 1;
1738}
1739
1740int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1741 size_t chainidx)
1742{
1743 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1744 if (!s->hit)
1745 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1746
1747 return 1;
1748}
1749
1750int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1751 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1752{
1753 unsigned int version;
1754
1755 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1756 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1758 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1759 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1760 return 0;
1761 }
1762
1763 /*
1764 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1765 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1766 */
1767 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1769 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1770 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1771 return 0;
1772 }
1773
1774 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1775 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1776 return 1;
1777
1778 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1779 s->version = version;
1780
1781 return 1;
1782}
1783
1784int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1785 size_t chainidx)
1786{
1787#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1788 unsigned int group_id;
1789 PACKET encoded_pt;
1790 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1791
1792 /* Sanity check */
1793 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1795 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1796 return 0;
1797 }
1798
1799 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1801 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1802 return 0;
1803 }
1804
1805 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1806 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1807 size_t i, num_groups;
1808
1809 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1812 return 0;
1813 }
1814
1815 /*
1816 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1817 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1818 */
1819 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1821 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1822 return 0;
1823 }
1824
1825 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1826 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1827 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1828 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1829 break;
1830 }
1831 if (i >= num_groups
1832 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1834 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1835 return 0;
1836 }
1837
1838 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1839 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1840 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1841 return 1;
1842 }
1843
1844 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1845 /*
1846 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1847 * key_share!
1848 */
1849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1850 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1851 return 0;
1852 }
1853
1854 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1855 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1857 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1858 return 0;
1859 }
1860
1861 skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1862 if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1865 return 0;
1866 }
1867 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1868 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1870 SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1871 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1872 return 0;
1873 }
1874
1875 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1877 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1878 return 0;
1879 }
1880 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1881#endif
1882
1883 return 1;
1884}
1885
1886int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1887 size_t chainidx)
1888{
1889 PACKET cookie;
1890
1891 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1892 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1893 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1895 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1896 return 0;
1897 }
1898
1899 return 1;
1900}
1901
1902int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1903 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1904{
1905 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1906 unsigned long max_early_data;
1907
1908 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1909 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1911 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1912 return 0;
1913 }
1914
1915 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1916
1917 return 1;
1918 }
1919
1920 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1922 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1923 return 0;
1924 }
1925
1926 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1927 || !s->hit) {
1928 /*
1929 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1930 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1931 * server should not be accepting it.
1932 */
1933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1934 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1935 return 0;
1936 }
1937
1938 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1939
1940 return 1;
1941}
1942
1943int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1944 size_t chainidx)
1945{
1946#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1947 unsigned int identity;
1948
1949 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1951 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1952 return 0;
1953 }
1954
1955 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1957 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1958 return 0;
1959 }
1960
1961 /*
1962 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1963 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1964 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1965 */
1966 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
1967 s->hit = 1;
1968 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1969 s->psksession = NULL;
1970 return 1;
1971 }
1972
1973 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
1974 /* Should never happen */
1975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1977 return 0;
1978 }
1979
1980 /*
1981 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1982 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1983 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1984 */
1985 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1986 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1987 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
1988 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
1989 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1990
1991 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1992 s->session = s->psksession;
1993 s->psksession = NULL;
1994 s->hit = 1;
1995 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
1996 if (identity != 0)
1997 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1998#endif
1999
2000 return 1;
2001}
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