SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52523

最後變更在這個檔案從52523是 52500,由 vboxsync 提交於 11 年前
supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Changed to blacklisting, added more logging.
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1	/* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 52500 2014-08-26 13:04:43Z vboxsync $ */
2	/** @file
3	* VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
4	*/
5
6	/*
7	* Copyright (C) 2006-2014 Oracle Corporation
8	*
9	* This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
10	* available from http://www.alldomusa.eu.org. This file is free software;
11	* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
12	* General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
13	* Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
14	* VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
15	* hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
16	*
17	* The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
18	* of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
19	* (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
20	* VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
21	* CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
22	*
23	* You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
24	* terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
25	*/
26
27	/*******************************************************************************
28	* Header Files *
29	*******************************************************************************/
30	#ifdef IN_RING0
31	# define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
32	# include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
33	# include <ntimage.h>
34	#else
35	# include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
36	# include "Wintrust.h"
37	# include "Softpub.h"
38	# include "mscat.h"
39	# ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
40	# define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
41	# endif
42	#endif
43
44	#include <VBox/sup.h>
45	#include <VBox/err.h>
46	#include <iprt/ctype.h>
47	#include <iprt/ldr.h>
48	#include <iprt/log.h>
49	#include <iprt/path.h>
50	#include <iprt/string.h>
51	#include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
52	#include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
53
54	#ifdef IN_RING0
55	# include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
56	#else
57	# include "SUPLibInternal.h"
58	#endif
59	#include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
60
61
62	/*******************************************************************************
63	* Defined Constants And Macros *
64	*******************************************************************************/
65	/** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
66	* Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
67	* calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
68	* use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
69	* enough a good while. */
70	#define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
71
72
73	#if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
74	# error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
75	#endif
76
77
78	/*******************************************************************************
79	* Structures and Typedefs *
80	*******************************************************************************/
81
82	#ifdef IN_RING3
83	typedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
84	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
85	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN phCatAdmin, const GUID pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
86	struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
87	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD pcbHash, BYTE pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
88	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
89	BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
90	typedef HCATINFO (WINAPI PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
91	DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo);
92	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
93	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
94	typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
95
96	typedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
97	DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam);
98	typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
99	typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
100	#endif
101
102
103	/*******************************************************************************
104	* Global Variables *
105	*******************************************************************************/
106	/** The build certificate. */
107	static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
108
109	/** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
110	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
111	/** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
112	static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
113
114	/** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
115	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
116	/** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
117	* g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
118	static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
119
120	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
121	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
122	/** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
123	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
124	#ifdef IN_RING3
125	/** The full 'Program Files' path. */
126	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
127	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
128	/** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
129	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
130	# endif
131	/** The full 'Common Files' path. */
132	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
133	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
134	/** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
135	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
136	# endif
137	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
138
139	static union
140	{
141	SID Sid;
142	uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
143	}
144	/** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
145	g_TrustedInstallerSid,
146	/** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
147	g_LocalSystemSid;
148
149
150	/** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
151	static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
152
153	#if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
154	/** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
155	* SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
156	uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
157	#endif
158
159	#ifdef IN_RING3
160	/** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
161	* See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
162	static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
163	#endif
164
165	#ifdef IN_RING3
166	/** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
167	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
168	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
169	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
170	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
171	PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
172	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
173	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
174	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
175	PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
176	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
177	PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
178	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
179	PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
180	/** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
181	PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
182	/** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
183	PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
184
185	/** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
186	static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
187	/** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
188	static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
189
190	#endif
191
192
193	/*******************************************************************************
194	* Internal Functions *
195	*******************************************************************************/
196	#ifdef IN_RING3
197	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
198	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
199	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
200	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
201	#endif
202
203
204
205
206	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
207	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
208	{
209	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
210	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
211
212	if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
213	return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
214
215
216	/*
217	* For some reason I'm getting occational read error in an XP VM with
218	* STATUS_FAILED_DRIVER_ENTRY. Redoing the call again works in the
219	* debugger, so try do that automatically.
220	*/
221	for (uint32_t iTry = 0;; iTry++)
222	{
223	LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
224	offNt.QuadPart = off;
225
226	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
227	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
228	NULL /hEvent/,
229	NULL /ApcRoutine/,
230	NULL /ApcContext/,
231	&Ios,
232	pvBuf,
233	(ULONG)cb,
234	&offNt,
235	NULL);
236	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
237	rcNt = Ios.Status;
238	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
239	{
240	if (Ios.Information == cb)
241	{
242	pNtViRdr->off = off + cb;
243	return VINF_SUCCESS;
244	}
245	#ifdef IN_RING3
246	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
247	"supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
248	Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
249	#endif
250	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
251	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
252	}
253
254	/*
255	* Delay a little before we retry?
256	*/
257	#ifdef IN_RING3
258	if (iTry == 0)
259	NtYieldExecution();
260	else if (iTry >= 1)
261	{
262	LARGE_INTEGER Time;
263	Time.QuadPart = -1000000 / 100; /* 1ms in 100ns units, relative time. */
264	NtDelayExecution(TRUE, &Time);
265	}
266	#endif
267	/*
268	* Before we give up, we'll try split up the request in case the
269	* kernel is low on memory or similar. For simplicity reasons, we do
270	* this in a recursion fashion.
271	*/
272	if (iTry >= 2)
273	{
274	if (cb >= _8K)
275	{
276	size_t const cbBlock = RT_ALIGN_Z(cb / 4, 512);
277	while (cb > 0)
278	{
279	size_t cbThisRead = RT_MIN(cb, cbBlock);
280	int rc = supHardNtViRdrRead(&pNtViRdr->Core, pvBuf, cbThisRead, off);
281	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
282	return rc;
283	off += cbThisRead;
284	cb -= cbThisRead;
285	pvBuf = (uint8_t *)pvBuf + cbThisRead;
286	}
287	return VINF_SUCCESS;
288	}
289
290	#ifdef IN_RING3
291	supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false, "supHardNtViRdrRead: Error %#x reading %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
292	rcNt, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
293	#endif
294	pNtViRdr->off = -1;
295	return VERR_READ_ERROR;
296	}
297	}
298	}
299
300
301	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
302	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
303	{
304	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
305	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
306	return pNtViRdr->off;
307	}
308
309
310	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
311	static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
312	{
313	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
314	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
315	return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
316	}
317
318
319	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
320	static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
321	{
322	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
323	return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
324	}
325
326
327	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
328	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
329	{
330	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
331	}
332
333
334	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
335	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
336	{
337	return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
338	}
339
340
341	/** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
342	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
343	{
344	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
345	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
346
347	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
348	pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
349
350	RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
351	return VINF_SUCCESS;
352	}
353
354
355	/**
356	* Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
357	*
358	* @returns iprt status code.
359	* @param hFile Native NT file handle.
360	* @param pwszName Optional file name.
361	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
362	* @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
363	*/
364	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
365	{
366	/*
367	* Try determine the size of the file.
368	*/
369	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
370	FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
371	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
372	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) \|\| !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
373	return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
374
375	/*
376	* Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
377	*/
378	size_t cchFilename = 0;
379	if (pwszName)
380	cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
381
382	int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
383	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
384	if (!pNtViRdr)
385	return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
386
387	/*
388	* Initialize the structure.
389	*/
390	if (cchFilename)
391	{
392	char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
393	rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
394	AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
395	}
396	else
397	pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
398
399	pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
400	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
401	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
402	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
403	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
404	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
405	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
406	pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
407	pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
408	pNtViRdr->off = 0;
409	pNtViRdr->cbFile = StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
410	pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
411	*ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
412	return VINF_SUCCESS;
413	}
414
415
416	/**
417	* Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
418	*
419	* @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
420	*
421	* @param hFile The handle to the file.
422	* @param pwszName The name of the file.
423	*/
424	static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
425	{
426	if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
427	return true;
428
429	/*
430	* Get the ownership information.
431	*/
432	union
433	{
434	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
435	SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
436	uint8_t abView[256];
437	} uBuf;
438	ULONG cbActual;
439	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
440	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
441	{
442	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
443	return false;
444	}
445
446	/*
447	* Check the owner.
448	*
449	* Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
450	* plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
451	* turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
452	* the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
453	*
454	* Note! We cannot really allow Builtin\Administrators here it's the default
455	* owner of anything an admin user creates. (We must, unforutnately,
456	* allow that in system32 though.)
457	*/
458	PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
459	Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
460	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
461	return true;
462	if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid))
463	return true;
464
465	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
466	pwszName, ((uint8_t )pOwner)[1] /SubAuthorityCount/ sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
467	return false;
468	}
469
470
471	/**
472	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
473	*
474	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
475	* @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
476	* @param pszRight The ascii string.
477	*/
478	static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
479	{
480	for (;;)
481	{
482	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
483	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
484	if (b != wc)
485	{
486	if (wc >= 0x80)
487	return false;
488	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
489	if (wc != b)
490	{
491	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
492	if (wc != b)
493	{
494	if (wc == '/')
495	wc = '\\';
496	if (b == '/')
497	b = '\\';
498	if (wc != b)
499	return false;
500	}
501	}
502	}
503	if (!b)
504	return true;
505	}
506	}
507
508
509	/**
510	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
511	*
512	* @returns true if equal, false if not.
513	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
514	* @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
515	*/
516	static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
517	{
518	size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
519	size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
520	if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
521	return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
522	return false;
523	}
524
525
526	/**
527	* Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
528	*
529	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
530	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
531	* @param pszPrefix The ascii prefix string.
532	*/
533	static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
534	{
535	for (;;)
536	{
537	RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
538	uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
539	if (b != wc)
540	{
541	if (!b)
542	return true;
543	if (wc >= 0x80 \|\| wc == 0)
544	return false;
545	wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
546	if (wc != b)
547	{
548	b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
549	if (wc != b)
550	{
551	if (wc == '/')
552	wc = '\\';
553	if (b == '/')
554	b = '\\';
555	if (wc != b)
556	return false;
557	}
558	}
559	}
560	}
561	}
562
563
564	/**
565	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
566	*
567	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
568	* @param pwszLeft The path to check.
569	* @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
570	* @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
571	* @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
572	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
573	*/
574	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
575	PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
576	{
577	if (cwcLeft < cwcRight \|\| !cwcRight \|\| !pwszRight)
578	return false;
579
580	/* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
581	if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
582	pwszLeft += cwcRight;
583	else
584	{
585	/* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
586	uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
587	while (cLeft-- > 0)
588	{
589	RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
590	RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
591	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
592	{
593	wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
594	wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
595	if (wcLeft != wcRight)
596	return false;
597	}
598	}
599	}
600
601	/* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
602	if ( !fCheckSlash
603	\|\| *pwszLeft == '\\'
604	\|\| *pwszLeft == '/')
605	return true;
606	return false;
607	}
608
609
610	/**
611	* Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
612	*
613	* @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
614	* @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
615	* @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
616	* @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
617	*/
618	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const pUniStrRight,
619	bool fCheckSlash)
620	{
621	return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
622	pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
623	}
624
625
626
627	/**
628	* Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
629	*
630	* @returns Number of slashes.
631	* @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
632	*/
633	static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
634	{
635	uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
636	RTUTF16 wc;
637	while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
638	if (wc == '/' \|\| wc == '\\')
639	cSlashes++;
640	return cSlashes;
641	}
642
643
644	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
645	/**
646	* Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
647	*
648	* @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
649	* @param pwszPath The path to examine.
650	*/
651	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
652	{
653	uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
654
655	if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
656	return false;
657
658	if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
659	return false;
660
661	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
662	return false;
663
664	return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
665	}
666	#else
667	# error should not get here..
668	#endif
669
670
671
672	/**
673	* Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
674	*
675	* @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
676	* @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
677	* @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
678	* @param fFlags Flags.
679	* @param hFile The file handle.
680	* @param rc The status code..
681	*/
682	static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
683	{
684	if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT \| SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
685	return rc;
686
687	/*
688	* Version macros.
689	*/
690	uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
691	#define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
692	#define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
693	#define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
694	#define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
695	#define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
696	#define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
697
698	/*
699	* The System32 directory.
700	*
701	* System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
702	* hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
703	* actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
704	* We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
705	* System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
706	* anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
707	* or being loaded from it.
708	*
709	* A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
710	* and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
711	* replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
712	*/
713	PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
714	uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
715	uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
716	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
717	{
718	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
719
720	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
721	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
722	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
723	return rc;
724
725	/* Core DLLs. */
726	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
727	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
728	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
729	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
730	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
731	return IS_W80() \|\| IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
732	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
733	return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
734	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
735	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
736	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
737	if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
738	{
739	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
740	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
741	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
742	return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
743	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
744	return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
745	}
746	#endif
747
748	#ifndef IN_RING0
749	/* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
750	version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
751	/** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
752	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
753	#else
754	return rc;
755	#endif /* IN_RING0 */
756	}
757
758
759	#ifndef IN_RING0
760	/*
761	* The WinSxS white list.
762	*
763	* Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
764	* could be required from WinSxS.
765	*/
766	cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
767	if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /fCheckSlash/))
768	{
769	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
770	cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
771
772	/* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
773	uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
774	if (cSlashes != 1)
775	return rc;
776
777	/* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
778	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
779	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
780	return rc;
781	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
782	}
783	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
784
785
786	#ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
787	/*
788	* AppPatch whitelist.
789	*/
790	if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
791	{
792	cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
793	pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
794
795	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
796	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
797	return rc;
798
799	# ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
800	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
801	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
802
803	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
804	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
805	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
806	# elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
807	if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
808	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
809	# endif
810	# endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
811
812	# ifdef IN_RING0
813	return rc;
814	# else
815	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
816	# endif
817	}
818	#endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
819
820
821	#ifndef IN_RING0
822	# if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
823	/*
824	* Program files and common files.
825	* Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
826	*/
827	if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
828	g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
829	true /fCheckSlash/)
830	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
831	g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
832	true /fCheckSlash/)
833	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
834	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
835	g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
836	true /fCheckSlash/)
837	\|\| supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
838	g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
839	true /fCheckSlash/)
840	# endif
841	)
842	{
843	if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
844	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
845	return rc;
846	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
847	}
848
849	# elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
850	/*
851	* Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
852	*/
853	if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
854	\|\| supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
855	return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
856
857	# endif
858	#endif /* !IN_RING0 */
859
860	/*
861	* Not permitted.
862	*/
863	return rc;
864	}
865
866
867	/**
868	* @callback_method_impl{RTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
869	* Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
870	*/
871	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
872	void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
873	{
874	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
875	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
876
877	/*
878	* If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
879	* callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
880	* build certificate without any second thoughts.
881	*/
882	if (hCertPaths == NIL_RTCRX509CERTPATHS)
883	{
884	if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
885	return VINF_SUCCESS;
886	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
887	}
888
889	/*
890	* Standard code signing capabilites required.
891	*/
892	int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, NULL, pErrInfo);
893	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
894	{
895	/*
896	* If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
897	* microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
898	*/
899	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
900	{
901	uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
902	uint32_t cFound = 0;
903	uint32_t cValid = 0;
904	for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
905	{
906	bool fTrusted;
907	PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
908	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
909	int rcVerify;
910	rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /pcNodes/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
911	NULL, NULL /pCertCtx/, &rcVerify);
912	AssertRCBreak(rc);
913
914	if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
915	{
916	Assert(fTrusted);
917	cValid++;
918
919	/*
920	* Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
921	*/
922	RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
923	rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
924	AssertRCBreak(rc);
925
926	PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
927	while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
928	{
929	PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
930	if (pCertCtx->pCert)
931	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
932	else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
933	pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
934	else
935	pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
936	if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
937	&& RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
938	cFound++;
939	RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
940	}
941
942	int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
943	}
944	}
945	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
946	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
947	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
948	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
949	"Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
950	}
951	}
952
953	/*
954	* More requirements? NT5 build lab?
955	*/
956
957	return rc;
958	}
959
960
961	static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
962	void const *pvSignature, size_t cbSignature,
963	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
964	{
965	/*
966	* Check out the input.
967	*/
968	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
969	Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
970
971	AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
972	PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
973	AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
974	AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
975	PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = &pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.paItems[0];
976
977	/*
978	* If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
979	* the signature.
980	*/
981	if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
982	{
983	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
984	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
985	&pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
986	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
987	}
988
989	/*
990	* Verify the signature.
991	*/
992	RTTIMESPEC ValidationTime;
993	RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
994
995	return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, 0, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, &ValidationTime,
996	supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
997	}
998
999
1000	/**
1001	* Verifies the given loader image.
1002	*
1003	* @returns IPRT status code.
1004	* @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
1005	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1006	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1007	* error/logging.
1008	* @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
1009	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1010	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1011	*/
1012	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
1013	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1014	{
1015	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
1016	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
1017
1018	#ifdef IN_RING3
1019	/* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
1020	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1021	return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
1022	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
1023	#endif
1024
1025	/*
1026	* Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
1027	* cheaper than the rest.
1028	*
1029	* We relax this for system32, like we used to, as there are apparently
1030	* some systems out there where the user, admin, or someone has changed the
1031	* ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll. Since we need user32.dll
1032	* and will be checking it's digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let
1033	* this thru. (The report was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
1034	* owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
1035	*
1036	* We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
1037	* and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
1038	* that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
1039	* SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
1040	*/
1041	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
1042	&& !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
1043	{
1044	if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
1045	g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
1046	true /fCheckSlash/))
1047	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
1048	"supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
1049	SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
1050	}
1051
1052	/*
1053	* Verify it.
1054	*
1055	* The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
1056	* signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
1057	*
1058	* For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
1059	* certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
1060	* potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
1061	*
1062	* Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
1063	* use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
1064	* validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
1065	* we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
1066	*/
1067	int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
1068	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1069	{
1070	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1071	if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
1072	&& (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
1073	&& pNtViRdr->uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
1074	pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
1075	#endif
1076
1077	rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
1078
1079	#ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
1080	if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1081	g_uBuildTimestampHack = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
1082	#endif
1083
1084	/*
1085	* Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
1086	* ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
1087	*/
1088	if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
1089	rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
1090	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1091	RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
1092
1093	/*
1094	* Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
1095	*/
1096	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
1097	{
1098	bool fEnforced = false;
1099	int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
1100	if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
1101	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
1102	pwszName, rc2);
1103	else if (!fEnforced)
1104	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
1105	"The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
1106	}
1107	}
1108	else
1109	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
1110
1111	#ifdef IN_RING3
1112	/*
1113	* Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
1114	*/
1115	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1116	#endif
1117
1118	#ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1119	/*
1120	* Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
1121	*/
1122	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1123	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
1124	#endif
1125
1126	return rc;
1127	}
1128
1129
1130	/**
1131	* Verifies the given executable image.
1132	*
1133	* @returns IPRT status code.
1134	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1135	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
1136	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
1137	* error/logging.
1138	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1139	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
1140	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1141	*/
1142	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags,
1143	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1144	{
1145	/*
1146	* Create a reader instance.
1147	*/
1148	PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
1149	int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
1150	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1151	{
1152	/*
1153	* Open the image.
1154	*/
1155	RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
1156	RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
1157	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RESOURCE_IMAGE)
1158	enmArch = RTLDRARCH_WHATEVER;
1159	rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
1160	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1161	{
1162	/*
1163	* Verify it.
1164	*/
1165	rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
1166	int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
1167	}
1168	else
1169	supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
1170	}
1171	SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
1172	rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? "WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
1173	return rc;
1174	}
1175
1176
1177	#ifdef IN_RING3
1178	/**
1179	* supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
1180	*
1181	* The name is derived from the handle.
1182	*
1183	* @returns IPRT status code.
1184	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
1185	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
1186	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1187	*/
1188	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1189	{
1190	/*
1191	* Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
1192	*/
1193	union
1194	{
1195	UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
1196	uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
1197	} uBuf;
1198
1199	ULONG cbIgn;
1200	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1201	ObjectNameInformation,
1202	&uBuf,
1203	sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1204	&cbIgn);
1205	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1206	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1207	else
1208	uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
1209
1210	return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, NULL /pfWinVerifyTrust/, pErrInfo);
1211	}
1212	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1213
1214
1215	/**
1216	* Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
1217	* directories.
1218	*
1219	* This code is also used by the support driver.
1220	*
1221	* @returns VBox status code.
1222	* @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
1223	* UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
1224	* discretion) the string buffer.
1225	* @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
1226	* @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
1227	* interested in.
1228	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
1229	*/
1230	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1231	{
1232	HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1233	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1234
1235	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
1236	switch (enmDir)
1237	{
1238	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
1239	{
1240	static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
1241	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
1242	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1243	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
1244	break;
1245	}
1246	case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
1247	{
1248	static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
1249	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
1250	NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
1251	NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
1252	break;
1253	}
1254	default:
1255	AssertFailed();
1256	return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1257	}
1258
1259	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1260	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1261
1262	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1263	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1264	&ObjAttr,
1265	&Ios,
1266	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1267	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1268	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1269	FILE_OPEN,
1270	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1271	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1272	0 /EaLength/);
1273	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1274	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1275	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1276	{
1277	ULONG cbIgn;
1278	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1279	ObjectNameInformation,
1280	pvBuf,
1281	cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
1282	&cbIgn);
1283	NtClose(hFile);
1284	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1285	{
1286	PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
1287	if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
1288	{
1289	/* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
1290	pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1291	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1292	}
1293
1294	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
1295	"NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
1296	}
1297	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1298	}
1299	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
1300	}
1301
1302
1303	/**
1304	* Initialize one certificate entry.
1305	*
1306	* @returns VBox status code.
1307	* @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
1308	* @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
1309	* @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
1310	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1311	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1312	*/
1313	static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
1314	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1315	{
1316	AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
1317	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
1318	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
1319	RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
1320
1321	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1322	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
1323	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
1324	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1325	rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
1326	return rc;
1327	}
1328
1329
1330	static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1331	{
1332	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
1333	{
1334	int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
1335	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1336	return rc;
1337	}
1338	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1339	}
1340
1341
1342	/**
1343	* Initialize a certificate table.
1344	*
1345	* @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
1346	* @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
1347	* @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
1348	* @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
1349	* @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
1350	* @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
1351	* @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
1352	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1353	* @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
1354	*/
1355	static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
1356	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
1357	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
1358	PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
1359	PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
1360	{
1361	AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1362
1363	int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
1364	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
1365	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
1366
1367	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
1368	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1369	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
1370	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1371	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
1372	return rc;
1373	}
1374
1375
1376
1377	#ifdef IN_RING3
1378	/**
1379	* Initializes the windows paths.
1380	*/
1381	static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
1382	{
1383	/*
1384	* Windows paths that we're interested in.
1385	*/
1386	static const struct
1387	{
1388	SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
1389	WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
1390	const char *pszLogName;
1391	} s_aPaths[] =
1392	{
1393	{ &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
1394	{ &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
1395	# ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
1396	{ &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
1397	{ &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
1398	# endif
1399	};
1400
1401	/*
1402	* Open the registry key containing the paths.
1403	*/
1404	UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
1405	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
1406	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1407	HANDLE hKey;
1408	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
1409	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1410	{
1411	/*
1412	* Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
1413	*/
1414	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1415	{
1416	/*
1417	* Query the value first.
1418	*/
1419	UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
1420	ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
1421	ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
1422	ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1423
1424	union
1425	{
1426	KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
1427	uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
1428	uint64_t uAlign;
1429	} uBuf;
1430
1431	ULONG cbActual = 0;
1432	rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
1433	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1434	{
1435	/*
1436	* Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
1437	*/
1438	if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
1439	\|\| uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
1440	{
1441	/*
1442	* Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
1443	* We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
1444	* reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
1445	*/
1446	UNICODE_STRING Src;
1447	Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
1448	Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
1449	if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
1450	Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
1451	Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
1452	Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1453
1454	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
1455	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
1456	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
1457	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
1458	UNICODE_STRING Dst;
1459	Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
1460	Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
1461	Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
1462
1463	if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
1464	rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
1465	else
1466	{
1467	memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
1468	Dst.Length = Src.Length;
1469	}
1470	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1471	{
1472	Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1473
1474	/*
1475	* Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
1476	*/
1477	Dst.Buffer -= 4;
1478	Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1479	Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
1480	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
1481	HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
1482	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
1483	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
1484	FILE_READ_DATA \| SYNCHRONIZE,
1485	&ObjAttr,
1486	&Ios,
1487	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
1488	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
1489	FILE_SHARE_READ \| FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
1490	FILE_OPEN,
1491	FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
1492	\| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
1493	NULL /EaBuffer/,
1494	0 /EaLength/);
1495	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1496	rcNt = Ios.Status;
1497	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1498	{
1499	/*
1500	* Query the real NT name.
1501	*/
1502	ULONG cbIgn;
1503	rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
1504	ObjectNameInformation,
1505	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
1506	sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
1507	&cbIgn);
1508	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1509	{
1510	if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
1511	{
1512	/* Make sure it's terminated.*/
1513	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
1514	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
1515	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
1516	}
1517	else
1518	{
1519	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
1520	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1521	}
1522	}
1523	else
1524	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1525	NtClose(hFile);
1526	}
1527	else
1528	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1529	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
1530	}
1531	else
1532	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
1533	s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
1534	}
1535	else
1536	{
1537	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
1538	rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
1539	}
1540	}
1541	else
1542	SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
1543
1544	/* Stub the entry on failure. */
1545	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1546	{
1547	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1548	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1549	}
1550	}
1551	NtClose(hKey);
1552	}
1553	else
1554	{
1555	SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
1556
1557	/* Stub all the entries on failure. */
1558	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
1559	{
1560	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
1561	s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
1562	}
1563	}
1564	}
1565	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
1566
1567
1568	/**
1569	* This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
1570	* every time we need to verify an image.
1571	*
1572	* @returns IPRT status code.
1573	* @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
1574	*/
1575	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
1576	{
1577	AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
1578
1579	/*
1580	* Get the system root paths.
1581	*/
1582	int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
1583	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1584	rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
1585	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1586	{
1587	SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1588	SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
1589	#ifdef IN_RING3
1590	supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
1591	#endif
1592
1593	/*
1594	* Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
1595	*/
1596	rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
1597	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1598	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1599	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
1600	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1601	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1602	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
1603	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1604	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
1605	g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
1606	g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
1607	g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
1608	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
1609	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1610	rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
1611	NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
1612	pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
1613
1614	#if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
1615	/* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
1616	trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
1617	if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
1618	&& RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
1619	#else
1620	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1621	#endif
1622	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1623	g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
1624
1625	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1626	{
1627	/*
1628	* Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
1629	*/
1630	SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
1631	NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
1632	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1633	{
1634	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
1635	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
1636	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
1637	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
1638	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
1639	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
1640
1641	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1642	rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
1643	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
1644	{
1645	*RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
1646	return VINF_SUCCESS;
1647	}
1648	}
1649	rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
1650	}
1651	supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
1652	}
1653	return rc;
1654	}
1655
1656
1657	/**
1658	* Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
1659	*/
1660	DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
1661	{
1662	if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
1663	RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
1664
1665	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
1666	g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1667	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
1668	g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1669
1670	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
1671	g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1672	RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
1673	g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
1674	}
1675
1676	#ifdef IN_RING3
1677
1678	/**
1679	* This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
1680	*
1681	* @returns true if wanted, false if not.
1682	* @param pCert The certificate.
1683	*/
1684	static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
1685	{
1686	char szSubject[512];
1687	szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0';
1688	RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
1689
1690	/*
1691	* Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
1692	*/
1693	if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
1694	{
1695	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
1696	return false;
1697	}
1698
1699	if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
1700	{
1701	if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
1702	&& (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
1703	{
1704	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
1705	return false;
1706	}
1707	if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
1708	&& !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
1709	{
1710	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
1711	return false;
1712	}
1713	}
1714	if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
1715	{
1716	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
1717	pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
1718	return false;
1719	}
1720	uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
1721
1722	# if 0
1723	/*
1724	* Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
1725	*/
1726	static struct
1727	{
1728	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1729	const char *pszName;
1730	} const s_aWanted[] =
1731	{
1732	/* SPC */
1733	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
1734	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
1735	{ UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1736
1737	/* TS */
1738	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
1739	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
1740	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
1741
1742	/* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
1743	{ UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
1744	{ UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
1745	{ UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
1746	{ UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
1747	{ UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
1748	{ UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1749	{ UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
1750	{ UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
1751	{ UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
1752	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
1753	{ UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
1754	{ UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
1755	{ UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
1756	{ UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
1757	{ UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
1758	{ UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
1759	{ UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
1760	{ UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
1761	{ UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
1762	{ UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
1763	{ UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
1764	{ UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
1765	{ UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
1766	{ UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
1767	{ UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
1768	{ UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
1769	{ UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
1770	{ UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, Email=info@valicert.com" },
1771	{ UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
1772	{ UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
1773	{ UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
1774	};
1775
1776
1777	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
1778	while (i-- > 0)
1779	if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1780	\|\| s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1781	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
1782	{
1783	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1784	return true;
1785	}
1786
1787	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1788	return false;
1789	# else
1790	/*
1791	* Blacklist approach.
1792	*/
1793	static struct
1794	{
1795	uint64_t u64KeyId;
1796	const char *pszName;
1797	} const s_aUnwanted[] =
1798	{
1799	{ UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
1800	};
1801
1802	uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted);
1803	while (i-- > 0)
1804	if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
1805	\|\| s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
1806	if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
1807	{
1808	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1809	return false;
1810	}
1811
1812	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
1813	return true;
1814	# endif
1815	}
1816
1817
1818	/**
1819	* Loads a module in the system32 directory.
1820	*
1821	* @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on faliure.
1822	* @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
1823	*/
1824	DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName)
1825	{
1826	WCHAR wszName[200+60];
1827	UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
1828	wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
1829	RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
1830
1831	DWORD fFlags = 0;
1832	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
1833	fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
1834	HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1835	if ( hMod == NULL
1836	&& fFlags
1837	&& g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
1838	&& GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
1839	{
1840	fFlags = 0;
1841	hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
1842	}
1843	if (hMod == NULL)
1844	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, GetLastError(), wszName);
1845	return hMod;
1846	}
1847
1848
1849	/**
1850	* Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
1851	* import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
1852	*
1853	* These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
1854	*/
1855	static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
1856	{
1857	uint32_t cAdded = 0;
1858
1859	/*
1860	* Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
1861	*/
1862	HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll");
1863
1864	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
1865	a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
1866	if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", GetLastError())
1867	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
1868	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
1869	RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
1870	#undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
1871
1872	/*
1873	* Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
1874	*/
1875	DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG \| CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
1876	HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1877	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1878	if (!hStore)
1879	hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING \| X509_ASN_ENCODING,
1880	NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER \| fOpenStore, L"Root");
1881	if (hStore)
1882	{
1883	PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
1884	while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
1885	{
1886	if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
1887	{
1888	RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
1889	RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
1890	RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
1891	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
1892	&g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
1893	RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
1894	int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
1895	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
1896	{
1897	if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
1898	{
1899	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1900	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1901	AssertRC(rc);
1902
1903	rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
1904	pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /pErrInfo/);
1905	AssertRC(rc);
1906	cAdded++;
1907	}
1908
1909	RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
1910	}
1911	/* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
1912	timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
1913	Ignore these failures and certificates. */
1914	else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
1915	AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
1916	}
1917	}
1918	pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
1919	g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
1920	}
1921	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
1922	}
1923
1924
1925	/**
1926	* Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
1927	* installs a thread creation hook.
1928	*
1929	* The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
1930	* code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
1931	* set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
1932	* and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
1933	* authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
1934	*
1935	* @param pszProgName The program name.
1936	*/
1937	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
1938	{
1939	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1940	/*
1941	* Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
1942	* security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
1943	* whatever they are).
1944	*
1945	* The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
1946	* irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
1947	*/
1948	char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
1949	supR3HardenedPathSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
1950	suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
1951	HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /fSystem32Only/);
1952	if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
1953	supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, GetLastError());
1954	# endif
1955
1956	/*
1957	* Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
1958	*/
1959	DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
1960	if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
1961	g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
1962	else
1963	supR3HardenedError(GetLastError(), false /fFatal/, "TlsAlloc failed");
1964
1965	/*
1966	* Resolve it.
1967	*/
1968	HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll");
1969	#define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
1970	do { \
1971	g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
1972	if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
1973	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError()); \
1974	} while (0)
1975
1976	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
1977	if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
1978	supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", GetLastError());
1979
1980	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
1981	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
1982	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
1983	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
1984	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
1985	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
1986
1987	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
1988	RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
1989
1990	/*
1991	* Call it on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it loads all the providers
1992	* now, we would otherwise geting into recursive trouble in the
1993	* NtCreateSection hook.
1994	*/
1995	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
1996	RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
1997	RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
1998	int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
1999	&ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2000	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2001	supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
2002	"WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
2003	# endif
2004
2005	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
2006	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2007	supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2008
2009	g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
2010	SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
2011
2012	# ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
2013	/*
2014	* Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
2015	* recursion trouble.
2016	*/
2017	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
2018	supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
2019	# endif
2020
2021	/*
2022	* Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
2023	*/
2024	supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
2025	}
2026
2027
2028	static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
2029	PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
2030	{
2031	static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
2032
2033	if (pwszNtName != '\\' && pwszNtName != '/')
2034	return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
2035
2036	size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
2037	if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
2038	return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
2039
2040	memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
2041	memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
2042	*ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
2043	return VINF_SUCCESS;
2044	}
2045
2046
2047	/**
2048	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
2049	*
2050	* @returns VBox status code.
2051	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2052	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2053	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2054	* error/logging.
2055	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2056	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2057	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2058	*/
2059	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2060	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2061	{
2062	/*
2063	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2064	*/
2065	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2066	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2067	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2068	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2069	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2070
2071	/*
2072	* Construct input parameters and call the API.
2073	*/
2074	WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
2075	RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
2076	FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
2077	FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2078	FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
2079
2080	GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
2081
2082	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2083	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2084	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2085	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2086	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2087	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2088	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2089	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2090	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2091	else
2092	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2093	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
2094	TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
2095
2096	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2097	if (hrc == S_OK)
2098	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2099	else
2100	{
2101	/*
2102	* Failed. Format a nice error message.
2103	*/
2104	# ifdef DEBUG_bird
2105	if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
2106	__debugbreak();
2107	# endif
2108	const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
2109	switch (hrc)
2110	{
2111	case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
2112	case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
2113	case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
2114	case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
2115	case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
2116	case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
2117	case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
2118	case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
2119	case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
2120	case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
2121	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
2122	case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
2123	case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
2124	case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
2125	case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
2126	case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
2127	case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
2128	}
2129	if (pszErrConst)
2130	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2131	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
2132	else
2133	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
2134	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
2135	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
2136	hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
2137	}
2138
2139	/* clean up state data. */
2140	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2141	FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
2142	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
2143
2144	return rc;
2145	}
2146
2147
2148	/**
2149	* Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
2150	*
2151	* @returns VBox status code.
2152	* @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
2153	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2154	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2155	* error/logging.
2156	* @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
2157	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2158	* @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
2159	*/
2160	static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
2161	PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
2162	{
2163	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
2164
2165	/*
2166	* Convert the name into a Windows name.
2167	*/
2168	RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
2169	PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
2170	int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
2171	if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
2172	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
2173
2174	/*
2175	* Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
2176	*/
2177	HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
2178	if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE \|\| hFile == NULL)
2179	{
2180	hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
2181	IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
2182
2183	UNICODE_STRING NtName;
2184	NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
2185	NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
2186	NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
2187
2188	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
2189	InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /hRootDir/, NULL /pSecDesc/);
2190
2191	NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
2192	FILE_READ_DATA \| READ_CONTROL \| SYNCHRONIZE,
2193	&ObjAttr,
2194	&Ios,
2195	NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
2196	FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
2197	FILE_SHARE_READ,
2198	FILE_OPEN,
2199	FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE \| FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
2200	NULL /EaBuffer/,
2201	0 /EaLength/);
2202	if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2203	rcNt = Ios.Status;
2204	if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
2205	return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
2206	"NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
2207	hFileClose = hFile;
2208	}
2209
2210	/*
2211	* On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
2212	*/
2213	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2214	static struct
2215	{
2216	/** The digest algorithm name. */
2217	const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
2218	/** Cached catalog admin handle. */
2219	HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
2220	} s_aHashes[] =
2221	{
2222	{ NULL, NULL },
2223	{ L"SHA256", NULL },
2224	};
2225	for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
2226	{
2227	/*
2228	* Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
2229	* required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
2230	*/
2231	bool fTryNextPolicy;
2232	uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
2233	static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
2234	{
2235	DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
2236	WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
2237	};
2238	do
2239	{
2240	/*
2241	* Create a context.
2242	*/
2243	fTryNextPolicy = false;
2244	bool fFreshContext = false;
2245	BOOL fRc;
2246	HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
2247	if (hCatAdmin)
2248	{
2249	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2250	fFreshContext = false;
2251	fRc = TRUE;
2252	}
2253	else
2254	{
2255	l_fresh_context:
2256	fFreshContext = true;
2257	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2258	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
2259	NULL /pStrongHashPolicy/, 0 /dwFlags/);
2260	else
2261	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /dwFlags/);
2262	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
2263	}
2264	if (fRc)
2265	{
2266	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
2267
2268	/*
2269	* Hash the file.
2270	*/
2271	BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
2272	DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
2273	if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
2274	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2275	else
2276	fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /dwFlags/);
2277	if (fRc)
2278	{
2279	/* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
2280	RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
2281	int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
2282	if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
2283	{
2284	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
2285
2286	/*
2287	* Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
2288	*/
2289	uint32_t iCat = 0;
2290	HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
2291	do
2292	{
2293	/* Get the next match. */
2294	HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
2295	if (!hCatInfo)
2296	{
2297	if (!fFreshContext)
2298	{
2299	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", GetLastError(), iCat));
2300	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2301	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/);
2302	g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/);
2303	goto l_fresh_context;
2304	}
2305	if (iCat == 0)
2306	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", GetLastError()));
2307	break;
2308	}
2309	Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
2310	hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
2311
2312	/*
2313	* Call WinVerifyTrust.
2314	*/
2315	CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
2316	CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
2317	CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
2318	if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /dwFlags/))
2319	{
2320	WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
2321	RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
2322	WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
2323	WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
2324	WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
2325	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
2326	WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
2327	WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
2328	WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
2329	WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
2330
2331	WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
2332	RT_ZERO(TrustData);
2333	TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
2334	TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
2335	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
2336	TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
2337	TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
2338	if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
2339	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
2340	else
2341	TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
2342	TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
2343	TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
2344
2345	HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2346	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
2347	hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
2348
2349	if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
2350	rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
2351	else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
2352	{ /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
2353	else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
2354	{ /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
2355	else
2356	{
2357	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
2358	"WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
2359	hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
2360	fTryNextPolicy \|= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
2361	}
2362
2363	/* clean up state data. */
2364	TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
2365	hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /hwnd/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
2366	Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
2367	}
2368	else
2369	{
2370	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2371	"CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
2372	GetLastError(), pwszName);
2373	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
2374	}
2375	iCat++;
2376	} while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
2377
2378	if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
2379	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /dwFlags/))
2380	AssertFailed();
2381	}
2382	else
2383	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
2384	}
2385	else
2386	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2387	"CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2388
2389	if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
2390	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /dwFlags/))
2391	AssertFailed();
2392	}
2393	else
2394	rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(GetLastError()),
2395	"CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", GetLastError(), pwszName);
2396	iPolicy++;
2397	} while ( fTryNextPolicy
2398	&& iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
2399
2400	/*
2401	* Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
2402	*/
2403	if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
2404	break;
2405	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2406	break;
2407	}
2408
2409	if (hFileClose != NULL)
2410	NtClose(hFileClose);
2411
2412	return rc;
2413	}
2414
2415
2416	/**
2417	* Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
2418	*
2419	* This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
2420	* supR3HardenedScreenImage.
2421	*
2422	* @returns IPRT status code.
2423	* @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
2424	* @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
2425	* dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
2426	* error/logging.
2427	* @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
2428	* actually used.
2429	* @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
2430	*/
2431	DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
2432	bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
2433	{
2434	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2435	*pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
2436
2437	/*
2438	* Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
2439	* some obvious recursion.
2440	*/
2441	if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
2442	{
2443	/* Check for recursion. */
2444	bool fNoRecursion;
2445	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2446	{
2447	fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
2448	if (fNoRecursion)
2449	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
2450	}
2451	else
2452	{
2453	uint32_t const idCurrentThread = GetCurrentThreadId();
2454	fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
2455	}
2456	if (fNoRecursion)
2457	{
2458	/* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
2459	if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
2460	*pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
2461
2462	if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2463	{
2464	if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
2465	{
2466	if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
2467	{
2468	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2469	SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
2470	rc = rc2;
2471	}
2472	else
2473	{
2474	AssertFailed();
2475	rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
2476	}
2477	}
2478	else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
2479	{
2480	/** @todo having trouble with a 32-bit windows box when letting these calls thru */
2481	rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2482	}
2483	else
2484	{
2485	int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
2486	AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
2487	("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
2488	}
2489	}
2490
2491	/* Unwind recursion. */
2492	if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
2493	TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
2494	else
2495	ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
2496	}
2497	else
2498	SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
2499	}
2500	return rc;
2501	}
2502
2503
2504	/**
2505	* Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
2506	*
2507	* Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
2508	* image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
2509	*
2510	* @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
2511	*/
2512	DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
2513	{
2514	return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
2515	&& ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
2516	? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
2517	: g_idActiveThread != GetCurrentThreadId() );
2518	}
2519
2520
2521
2522	/**
2523	* Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
2524	* Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
2525	*/
2526	DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(void)
2527	{
2528	/*
2529	* Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
2530	* GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
2531	* the application manifest).
2532	*/
2533	OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
2534
2535	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2536	NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
2537	if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
2538	{
2539	RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
2540	PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
2541	NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
2542	NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
2543	NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSPlatformId;
2544	}
2545
2546	g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
2547	NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
2548	}
2549
2550	#endif /* IN_RING3 */
2551

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source: vbox/trunk/src/VBox/HostDrivers/Support/win/SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp@ 52523

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